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VOLUME 1998, NUMBER 2
Reining in the "Manifest Disregard"
of the Law Standard:




Section 10(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA)' sets out four very narrow
grounds upon which the courts can vacate commercial arbitration awards. Those
grounds are:
Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means;
Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either
of them.; Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to
postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear
evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; and
Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed
them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
On its face, Section 10(a) does not sanction judicial inquiry of any sort into the
merits of commercial arbitration awards. Instead, its clear and unambiguous
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language speaks primarily in terms of party, advocate and arbitrator misconduct or
misbehavior affecting the arbitration proceeding or its outcome.
Despite the facial clarity of Section 10(a), all twelve U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals (save the Federal Circuit) have embraced one or more of a variety of
nonstatutory grounds for vacatur. Seminal among the nonstatutory grounds for
vacatur is the "manifest disregard" of the law standard first articulated by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1953 opinion Wilko v. Swan.3 In one fashion or another these
nonstatutory standards permit courts deciding petitions for vacatur to evaluate the
accuracy (on the facts) and the correctness (on the relevant law and disputed contract
language) of challenged awards.4 The obvious incongruity between Section 10(a)
of the FAA and the nonstatutory grounds for vacatur is jumping off point for this
analysis.
II. THESIS OF THE ARTICLE AND FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS
The nonstatutory grounds for vacatur, including "manifest disregard" of the
law, present a significant impediment to the maturation and institutionalization of
commercial arbitration as an effective altemative to traditional litigation. First, they
rob the process of its most essential feature - finality - by giving parties
disappointed with the result reached in arbitration reason to believe they may be able
to circumvent objectionable awards by resort to the courts. Second, by encouraging
petitions for vacatur, the nonstatutory grounds increase the expense, time to
resolution and consternation associated with commercial arbitration. Finally,
because they facilitate judicial review of the reasoning and mode of decision
underlying challenged arbitral results, the nonstatutory grounds are an overwhelming
disincentive to reasoned awards that reveal the manner in which the arbitrator
decides disputed questions of fact, contract interpretation and law.5 In doing so, they
3. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
4. Thus, an award may be vacated if it is in "manifest disregard" of the law; is in direct conflict with
"public policy;" is "arbitrary and capricious;" is "completely irrational;" or "fails to draw its essence"
from the parties' underlying contract. A full analysis of the effect of the nonstatutory grounds for
vacatur is beyond the scope of this article. For a comprehensive treatment of this topic see Stephen L.
Hayford, Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of Commercial Arbitration Awards, 30 GA.
L. REv. 731, 763-842 (1996).
5. The case law makes clear that it is the absence of reasoned awards, revealing the mode of arbitral
analysis and decision, that prevents the courts from relying upon the nonstatutory grounds to overturn
arbitration awards they find suspect. See. e.g., Prudential-Bache Sec. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 241, 243(1st Cir. 1995) ("where arbitrators do not explain the reasons for justifying their award, '[the party
seeking vacatur] is hard pressed to satisfy the exacting criteria for [vacatur under the manifest disregard
of law criterion]' (quoting O.R. Sec., Inc. v. Professional Planning Assocs., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (1st
Cir. 1995)); Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 903 F.2d 1410, 1413 (11 th Cir. 1990)(observing that in the absence of reasons provided by the arbitrators for the award, judicial review could
not be effective); Sargent v. Paine Webber Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 882 F.2d 529, 532 (D.C. Cir. 1989)("Clearly insistence on an explanation would increase the ability of courts to spot the sort of [arbitral
transgression] that justifies overturning an arbitral award."); O.R. Sec., 857 F.2d at 747 ("When the
arbitrators do not give their reasons, it is nearly impossible for the court to determine whether [vacation
is warranted]."). Consequently, the conventional wisdom of commercial arbitration holds that the
advantages on-the-record decision making in commercial arbitration are outweighed by the greatly
increased threat of vacatur they would create. See also 3 IAN MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
2
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 1998, Iss. 2 [1998], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1998/iss2/1
1998] Reining in the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Standard 119
ensure that arbitral decision making remains off the record and unrevealed--causing
many to suspect the rigor and reliability of arbitration as a surrogate for adjudication
in the courts.6
The thesis of this article is that if the "manifest disregard" of the law standard
is either rejected as doctrinally unsound or somehow harmonized with Section 10(a)
of the FAA in a manner that precludes judicial intrusion into the merits of
commercial arbitration awards, the legitimacy of all of the remaining nonstatutory
grounds for vacatur will be eviscerated. If those nonstatutory standards were
eliminated, the law of vacatur would be restored to the simple, straightforward
standards articulated by Congress in Section 10(a) of the FAA.
At the same time, the substantial barrier to reasoned awards in commercial
arbitration presented by the "manifest disregard" of the law standard and the other,
lesser nonstatutory grounds would be eliminated. On the record decision-making
would become the norm in commercial arbitration. Finally, the time to resolution,
expense and overall complexity of commercial arbitration would be significantly
reduced. All of these changes would serve to hasten the evolution of commercial
arbitration as a distinct and viable alternative to traditional litigation.
The tension at the heart of the contemporary law of vacatur-between the
congressionally articulated scheme that does not sanction judicial evaluation of the
correctness or accuracy of arbitration awards and a body of judge-made law whose
only purpose is to facilitate such judicial inquiry-must be resolved. Until it is,
confusion will continue to be the order of the day and commercial arbitration will
remain hostage to the specter of judicial vacatur of awards. This article is intended
to ameliorate the current confusion in the law of vacatur by carefully explicating the
"manifest disregard" of the law standard and demonstrating how it can be removed
from the nonstatutory sphere.
In the analysis that follows the various approaches developed by the circuit
courts of appeals in implementing and applying the "manifest disregard" of the law
standard are described and evaluated. The core elements of the "manifest disregard"
of the law inquiry are identified and the four primary modes of analysis found in the
current case law are described and critiqued. Next, an alternative mode of analysis
is proposed that is both loyal to the Wilko standard and harmonizes the "manifest
disregard" of the law construct with Section 10(a) of the FAA. The commentary
concludes with a discussion of the long-run viability of the "manifest disregard" of
the law standard and an assertion that it must either be rejected entirely or brought
within the embrace of the Section 10(a) statutory grounds for vacatur.
LAW §§ 37.4.1, 37:12 (Supp. 1994) ("It is often said that the absence of written rationale insulates the
award from judicial review."); Whitmore Gray, Drafting the Dispute Resolution Clause, in COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION FOR THE 1990S 140, 150, (Richard Medalie ed., 1991) ("Some [arbitration] rules, such as
those of the AAA, do not require reasoned awards in commercial cases, proceeding from the premise that
the less said, the fewer the grounds for attacking the award. . . . Unless the arbitrator makes a
commitment to a theory and gives reasons, a party may find it difficult to prove that the arbitrator
exceeded his or her authority in the award made."); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American
Arbitration, 63 IND. L.J. 425, 485 (1988) ("The use of substantive written awards in commercial
arbitration] would probably increase the likelihood of appeal and judicial review of the award.").
6. See Stephen Hayford & Ralph Peeples, Commercial Arbitration in Evolution: An Assessment and
Call for Dialogue, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 343, 401-05 (1995).
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III. THE ORIGIN OF THE "MANIFEST DISREGARD"OF THE LAW
GROUND FOR VACATUR
Ten of the twelve circuit courts of appeals have sanctioned "manifest disregard"
of the law as a nonstatutory ground for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards.7
Only the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals have declined to approve it.
The oft-cited Wilko dictum is the sole basis for the "manifest disregard" of the law
standard. In Wilko the Supreme Court was presented with a question of the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement between a broker and a customer in a
dispute involving issues arising under the Securities Act of 1933. 8 In holding the
arbitration agreement unenforceable with regard to statutory claims arising under the
1933 Act, the Court concluded that the effectiveness of the Act's provisions meant
to protect investors "is lessened in arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings." 9
In the course of an opinion highly critical of commercial arbitration and
commercial arbitrators, the Court observed as follows, in dictum
While it may be true . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in
accordance with the provisions of [relevant law] would "constitute grounds
for vacating the award pursuant to section 1 0[a] of the Federal Arbitration
Act," that failure would need to be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted
submissions [to arbitration] . . . the interpretations of the law by the
arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard [of the law] are not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.'0
The Wilko Court made clear its belief that arbitrators are not well suited to deciding
questions of law and/or applying law to fact. In addition, the Court was troubled by
the fact that arbitrators need not explain their awards and generally fail to make the
type of record necessary to facilitate effective judicial review of their decisions.
Those actual and perceived shortcomings of the commercial arbitration process, and
the absence of judicial review for error in interpretation of the law, left the Court
convinced that arbitration was an inappropriate vehicle for the adjudication of
statutory claims."
7. See Willemijn Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9 (2d Cir.1997); Barnes v. Logan, 122 F.3d 820 (9th Cir. 1997); Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 128 F.3d1456 (11 th Cir. 1997); M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr& Co., 87 F.3d 844 (6th Cir. 1996); Prudential-BacheSec., Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234 (1st Cir. 1995); United Transp. Union Local 1589 v. Suburban TransitCorp., 51 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1995); National Wrecking Co. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 731,990 F.2d 957 (7th Cir. 1993); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883 (8th Cir. 1993); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball &Turben, Inc., 949 F.2d 1175 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th
Cir. 1988).
8. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953).
9. Id. at 435.
10. Id. (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 433-437. Specifically, the Court held that an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims arising
under the 1933 Act constituted a "stipulation" waiving compliance with a "provision" of the Act (thatguaranteeing the right of a disgruntled investor claiming a violation of the Act to select the judicialforum), in violation of its section 14. Id. at 434-35. The key to that holding was the Court's conclusionthat the effectiveness of the Act's provisions meant to protect investors "is lessened in arbitration as
compared to judicial proceedings." Id. at 435. By categorizing the right to a judicial forum as a
(Vol. 1998, No. 2
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In 1989 the Supreme Court reversed Wilko in Rodriguez de Quias v. Shearson
lAmerican Express.2 The issue in Rodriguez -- "whether a predispute agreement to
arbitrate claims arising under the Securities Act of 1933 is unenforceable, requiring
resolution of the claims only in a judicial forum"'3 -- centered on the very same
question decided by the Court in Wilko. That question is "whether an agreement to
arbitrate future controversies constitutes a binding stipulation 'to waive compliance
with any provision' of the Securities Act, which is nullified by § 14 of the Act." 4 In
ignoring the rule of Wilko that section 12(2) claims under the 1933 Act were not
arbitrable, the Fifth Circuit concluded the Supreme Courts' recent decisions
concerning commercial arbitration had reduced Wilko to "obsolescence."' 5 With
surprisingly little fanfare, given the fact that it was reversing its own precedent of
some 36 years standing, the Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit's
assessment of Wilko.
The Supreme Court's rejection of Wilko, and the "old judicial hostility to
arbitration" which pervaded its characterization of the commercial arbitration
process, was founded on what the Court described as an "erosion" of that view over
the years, " as intensified by the Court's holdings in Shearson/American Express v.
McMahon,'7 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,'8 Dean
Witter Reynolds v. Byrd,'9 and Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury
Construction Corp.20 In particular, the Rodriguez Court focused on the statement in
Mitsubishi that "[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo
the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits their resolution to an
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."' The Court then stated emphatically: "[tlo the
extent that Wilko rested on suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the
protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen
far out of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring
this method of resolving disputes. ,
22
In reversing Wilko in Rodriguez the Court did not address the "manifest
disregard" of the law dictum.23 In the 46 years since Wilko the Supreme Court has
substantive right that is effectively waived by an agreement to arbitrate future disputes, the Supreme
Court laid a broad foundation for the presumption that arbitration was not a suitable vehicle for the
adjudication of claims based on federal statutory law.
12. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
13. Id. at 478.
14. Id. at 479.
15. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 845 F.2d 1296, 1299 (5th Cir. 1988), quoted
in Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 479.
16. Rodriguez, 490 U.S. at 480-81.
17. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
18. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985).
19. 470 U.S. 213 (1985).
20. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
21. Rodriquez, 490 U.S. at 481 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
22. Id. at 481-82.
23. The standard has been mentioned in Supreme Court opinions only three times since 1953, always
in dictum, always in passing, twice in dissent. In his dissent in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., Justice Stevens noted, without further comment, "[airbitration awards are
reviewable for manifest disregard of the law." 473 U.S. 614, 656 (1985) (Stevens, dissenting). In his
partial concurring/partial dissenting opinion in Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, Justice
5
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never elucidated as to the meaning and effect it attributes to the "manifest disregard"
of the law standard. Similarly, the Court has never clarified the manner in which the
"manifest disregard" construct relates, if at all, to the statutory grounds for vacatur
of commercial arbitration awards articulated in Section 10(a) of the FAA. Because
a majority of the Supreme Court has never spoken definitively to the continued
viability of the "manifest disregard" of the law standard in light of Rodriguez, the
question of whether the Wilko dictum is still a proper basis for this and all of the
other nonstatutory grounds for vacatur remains open.24
The broad acceptance of the "manifest disregard" of the law ground by the U.S.
Circuit Courts of Appeals demonstrates they do not question its legitimacy and
continued viability. Regardless, the numerous Circuit Court of Appeals opinions
approving the "manifest disregard" ground have failed to produce a unitary, clearly
articulated mode of analysis. The omission by the Supreme Court to clarify whether
the "manifest disregard" of the law standard remains operative today, and the
disarray that omission has created in the law of vacatur, are the genesis for this
article. The section which follows describes the efforts of the U.S. Circuit Courts of
Appeals to fill the void left by the Supreme Court's omission to address the
"manifest disregard" of the law ground for vacatur in the 45 years since Wilko.
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE OF THE RELEVANT CASE LAW
The case law makes clear that "a party seeking to vacate an arbitration award
for "manifest disregard" of the law may not proceed by merely objecting to the
results of the arbitration."25 "Manifest disregard" of the law "clearly means more
than [an arbitral] error or misunderstanding with respect to the law., 26 As the
Blackmun observed: "[j]udicial review is still substantially limited to the four grounds listed in § 10 of
the [Federal] Arbitration Act and to the concept of 'manifest disregard' of the law." 482 U.S. 220, 259(1987). The third reference by the Supreme Court to the Wilko manifest disregard dictum is found in
a parenthetical phrase in dictum in the 1995 case, First Options of Chicago v. Kaplan. 514 U.S. 938
(1995).
24. For an argument that the reversal of Wilko by Rodriguez can be viewed as effectively mooting the
"manifest disregard of the law" dictum of the latter case see Hayford, supra note 4, at 812-23. But see
E. AI-Harbi v. Citibank, N.A., 85 F.3d 680, 684 n. I (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Although the holding in Wilko
was overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., the dicta that constitutes the
core of appellant's argument [relying upon the "manifest disregard of the law" ground for vacatur] was
unaffected by the grounds of the overruling."); Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704,
706 (7th Cir. 1994) (asserting that the reversal of Wilko by the Supreme Court and its rejection of the
anti-arbitration mindset of the Wilko court warrants the conclusion that the "manifest disregard of the
law" ground should is void).
25. O.R. Sec., Inc. V. Professional Planning Assocs., 857 F.2d 742,747 (1st Cir. 1995).
26. Carte Blanche (Singapore) PTE. Ltd. v. Carte Blanche Int'l., 888 F.2d 260, 265 (2d Cir. 1989)(quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986))(citing Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892-93 (2d Cir. 1985)); Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d
348, 352 (2d Cir. 1978); I/S Stavborg v. National Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 432 (2d Cir.
1974)); see also San Martine Compania De Navegacion v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801(9th Cir. 1961) ("[M]anifest disregard must be something beyond and different from a mere error in the
law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand or apply the law."); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, 949 F.2d 1175, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("[M]anifest disregard means much more than a failure
to apply the correct law."); E. Al-Harbi, 85 F.3d at 682 ("[T]his nonstatutory theory of vacatur cannot
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
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Eleventh Circuit observed in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Brothers, Inc. :27 "[a]n
arbitration board that incorrectly interprets the law has not manifestly disregarded
it. It has simply made a legal mistake."28 The line between a mere error of law by
an arbitrator and "manifest disregard" of the law was not made clear by the Supreme
Court in Wilko.29 Nevertheless, the case law indicates consensus among the circuit
courts as to the general nature of the judicial inquiry called for in applying this
nonstatutory ground for vacatur.
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker,30 the Second Circuit
stated:
The [arbitral] error [of law] must have been obvious and capable of being
readily and instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as
an arbitrator. Moreover, the term "disregard" implies that the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing principle but decides to
ignore it or pay no attention to it." (citation omitted). . .Judicial inquiry
under the manifest disregard standard is therefore extremely limited. The
governing law alleged to have been ignored by the arbitrators must be well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable. [The courts] are not at liberty to
set aside an arbitration panel's award because of an arguable difference
regarding the meaning or applicability of the laws urged upon it."
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in San Martine observed: "[w]e apprehend that a
'manifest disregard of the law' in the context of the language used in Wilko v. Swan
(citation omitted) might be present when arbitrators understand and correctly state
the law, but proceed to disregard same."32 The First Circuit, speaking in similar terms
in Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy,3 3 stated: "[i]n this context... 'disregard' implies that
empower a District Court to conduct the same de novo review of questions of law that an appellate court
exercises over lower court decisions. Indeed, we have in the past held that 'it is clear that [manifest
disregard] means more than error or misunderstanding with respect to the law."' (quoting Kanuth, 949
F.2d at 1178)).
27. 128 F.3d 1456 (llth Cir. 1997).
28. Id. at 1461.
29. San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801 ("[In Wilko] [t]he Court did not undertake to define what it meant
by 'manifest disregard' or indicate where the line would be drawn between a case of'manifest disregard'
and a case of error in interpretation of the law.").
30. 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
31. Id. at 933, quoted in M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 1996);
International Telepassport Corp. v. USFI, Inc., 89 F.3d 82, 85 (2d Cir. 1996); Conntech Dev. Co. v.
University of Connecticut Educ. Properties, Inc., 102 F.3d 677, 687 (2d Cir. 1996), cited in Advest. Inc.
v McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1 st Cir. 1990); see also Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1214
(2d Cir. 1972) ("[lf [] arbitrators simply ignore the applicable law, the literal application of the
"manifest disregard" standard should presumably compel vacation of the award."); Fahnestock & Co.
v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Illustrative of the degree of 'disregard' necessary to
support vacatur under [the manifest disregard standard] is our holding that manifest disregard will be
found where an 'arbitrator 'understood and correctly stated the law but proceeded to ignore it."' (quoting
Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 893 (2d Cir. 1985))).
32. San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801. The court went on to describe the "manifest disregard of the law"
standard as contemplating "manifest infidelity to what the arbitrators know to be the law, but deliberately
disregard." Id.
33. 914 F.2d 6(1st Cir. 1990).
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the arbitrators appreciated the existence of a legal rule but willfully decided not to
apply it."'34 The Eighth Circuit, although declining to adopt the standard in Marshall
v. Green Giant Co.," nevertheless clarified its view of the two-step inquiry for
identifying when an arbitrator has engaged in a "manifest disregard of the law." It
observed,"[m]anifest disregard of the law exists when the arbitrator commits an error
that was 'obvious and capable of being readily and instantly perceived by the
average person qualified to serve as an arbitrator . . . "[and] when "the arbitrator
appreciates the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but decides to ignore
or pay no attention to it." 36
A. The Constituent Elements of the "Manifest Disregard" of
the Law Inquiry
These articulations of the "manifest disregard" of the law standard reveal its
two constituent elements as currently applied by the U.S. Courts of Appeals. One
element looks to the result reached in arbitration and evaluates whether it is clearly
consistent or inconsistent with the controlling law. For this element to be satisfied,
a reviewing court must conclude that the arbitrator misapplied or failed to apply the
relevant law touching upon the dispute before her in a manner that constitutes a
blatant, gross error of law that is apparent on the face of the award. Thus, this
component of the manifest disregard inquiry looks to an "actus reus"-like
dimension-the commission of a very serious error of law (actually taking the form
of a misapplication of law to fact) by the arbitrator.
Under a proper view of the "manifest disregard" of the law standard, an error
of law, no matter how obvious or outrageous a court may deem it to be, cannot alonejustify vacatur. That conclusion requires evaluation of the second element of the
"manifest disregard" of the law standard-the arbitrator's knowledge, her awareness
of the relevant law and the manner in which she behaved in light of that knowledge.
Contrasted with the first, "actus reus"-like element of the "manifest disregard"
inquiry, this second step of the analysis takes the form of a two-dimensional "mens
rea"-like, state of mind determination.
Thus, even if a reviewing court finds a blatant misapplication of the relevant
law (reflected in an arbitral result it believes to conflict with that law), vacatur is
warranted under the "manifest disregard" of the law ground only if the court is able
to conclude the arbitrator knew, correctly interpreted the relevant law, but
nevertheless made a conscious, intentional decision to ignore it.37 Both aspects of
34. Id. at 10. See also Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1461 (11 th Cir. 1997) ("To
manifestly disregard the law, one, must be conscious of the law and deliberately ignore it."); MerrillLynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1995) (In Jaros, the Sixth Circuit
stated that vacatur for "manifest disregard of the law" is appropriate where "(1) the applicable legal
principle is clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed
that legal principle.").
35. 942 F.2d 539, 550 (8th Cir. 1991).
36. Id.
37. M & C Corp. v. Erwin Behr & Co., 87 F.3d 844, 851 (6th Cir. 1996) (observing that, on the facts
of the case before it, no "manifest disregard of the law" was shown because "any mistake by the
arbitrator in applying [the relevant law] was more likely the result of inadvertence, rather than a
conscious decision to ignore the relevant law" (emphasis added)).
[Vol. 1998, No. 2
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the "mens rea" requirement must be satisfied- the arbitrator must have been aware
of the correct law and further must have consciously or intentionally chosen not to
apply it to the facts of the case in rendering the award. Absent evidence in the record
before the reviewing court reliably demonstrating that the arbitrator actually
misapplied the relevant law and did so with the knowledge of the error of that action
and/or the intention to nullify the law or an awareness that he was doing so, vacatur
is not appropriate.
B. The Dilemma Raised by the Absence of Reasoned Awards
in Commercial Arbitration
The relevant case law shows that when deciding petitions for vacatur brought
under the "manifest disregard" of the law ground, the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals
unfailingly commence their analysis with an incantation of the two-step, "actus
reus-mens rea" standard. As the above-cited opinions demonstrate, the two
elements are not always ordered in the same manner. Some courts place the "actus
reus" (error of law) dimension first whereas other courts place the "mens rea"
(knowledge of the law) element first.
Regardless, having invoked the "manifest disregard" of the law template, those
courts inevitably find themselves unable to apply it directly, in two distinct steps.
It is simple enough for a court to decide if the first, "actus reus" element of the
"manifest disregard" inquiry is satisfied. The court need only determine if the error
of law it perceives in the challenged award is of sufficient gravity to satisfy whatever
error threshold it has set down under that element. The "mens rea" step of the
"manifest disregard" of the law analysis is far more difficult to effect.
Reasoned awards, revealing the manner in which the arbitrator decided the
questions of fact, law and contract, and application of law and contract to facts, are
the exception in commercial arbitration in the United States.38 In the absence of
reasoned awards setting forth the mode of arbitral decision, courts cannot actually
ascertain (and the petitioner for vacatur cannot actually prove) that the arbitrator in
fact knew the correct law. Consequently, it is impossible for the courts to determine
first hand that the arbitrator knowingly or intentionally disregarded the relevant law
in fashioning the award. The case law reveals that when confronted with this
dilemma, the circuit courts of appeals have responded in one of three ways. Each
of these modes of judicial response is described and critiqued below.
C. The "Futility Acknowledged" Approach to the "Manifest
Disregard" of the Law Analysis
In the most simplistic mode of response reviewing courts concede the futility
of attempting to divine the arbitrator's state of mind (the "mens rea" element) in the
38. See I MARTIN DOMKE, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, § 29:06, at 435-36 (Gabriel M.
Wilner et al. eds., rev. ed., supp. 1994) ("[C]ommercial arbitration awards ... are rarely accompanied
by written opinions.").
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absence of a reasoned award and summarily reject the petition for vacatur.39 The
vast majority of circuit appeals opinions applying the "manifest disregard" of the law
standard use this approach. Because this analytical tack never leads to vacatur, it
reduces the "manifest disregard" of the law ground to a nullity.
A reviewing court that requires direct evidence of arbitral knowledge of the
correct interpretation of the law (the "mens rea" element) will never vacate an award
that does not set forth the arbitrator's conclusions of law and fails to reveal the
manner in which the arbitrator applied that law to the facts of the controversy.
Beside the obvious uselessness of a criterion that cannot be effected, the far bigger
problem with this perspective on the "manifest disregard" standard is the substantial
disincentive it creates to reasoned awards in commercial arbitration.40
Undoubtedly, many of the parties to the commercial arbitration process, and the
advocates who represent them, would prefer that arbitrators reveal the findings of
fact, and the identification and application of the relevant contract language and law
that led to their awards. While the "futility acknowledged" approach to the
"manifest disregard" of the law standard effectively insulates awards from vacatur,
it at the same time serves to perpetuate the "no reasoned awards" status quo in
commercial arbitration by effectively precluding the widespread use of reasoned
awards in cases which turn in any way on questions of law.
If parties and advocates who desire reasoned awards in such cases could require
them without imperiling the finality of the arbitral result, the perception that
commercial arbitration is a fair and rigorous alternative to traditional litigation would
undoubtedly be enhanced. It can hardly be disputed that an alternative dispute
resolution device that features on the record decision-making is superior to, and
more acceptable to potential users, than one which does not. Besides minor concerns
regarding increased fees for arbitrator study time and extended time to decision,
there are no substantial reasons, other than enhanced risk of vacatur, currently
preventing parties that desire reasoned awards from directing arbitrators to provide
them. Because the "futility acknowledge" approach to the "manifest disregard" of
the law ground precludes wider use of reasoned awards, it is deeply flawed.
Consequently, it cannot remain the dominant mode of deciding petitions for vacatur
brought under the "manifest disregard" of the law ground.
39. See Prudential-Bache Sec. Inc. v. Tanner, 72 F.3d 234, 240 (1st Cir. 1995) ("[W]hen the
arbitrators do not give their reasons, it is nearly impossible for the court to determine whether they acted
in disregard of the law." (quoting O.R. Sec., 857 F.2d at 747)); see also Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith v. Jaros, 70 F.3d 418, 421 (6th Cir. 1997) ("Where ..... the arbitrators decline to explain their
resolution of certain questions of law, a p'arty seeking to award set aside faces a tremendous obstacle.");
Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 10 (1 st Cir. 1990) (" [As] arbitrators need not need explain their
award (citation omitted) and did not do so here, it is no wonder that [the petitioner for vacatur] is hard
pressed to satisfy the exacting criteria for invocation of [the manifest disregard of the law] doctrine."(citing O.R. Sec., 857 F.2d at 747 & n.4 (observing that a showing of "manifest disregard of the law" is
"extremely difficult" in the absence of a reasoned award))).
40. For a full description and analysis of this dynamic see Stephen L. Hayford, A New Paradigm for
Commercial Arbitration: Rethinking the Relationship Between Reasoned Awards and the Judicial
Standards for Vacatur, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 443 (1998).
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D. The "Big Error" Approach to the "Manifest Disregard" of
the Law Analysis
The second approach to the "manifest disregard" of the law analysis short
circuits the two-step inquiry by focusing only on the "actus reus" element. It
bypasses the "mens rea" component entirely and relies instead upon an inference of
constructive knowledge of the law by the arbitrator based on the clarity of the
relevant law and the degree of error reflected in the challenged award. This mode
of analysis effectively transforms the "manifest disregard" of the law test into a
standard warranting vacatur anytime an arbitrator commits what amounts to a "big
error" of law.
Under this view, the key for the petitioner seeking vacatur is convincing a
reviewing court that the controlling law is so clear and well-settled as to warrant the
inference that the arbitrator must have been aware of it. If a reviewing court
concludes that the controlling law is of "widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and
irrefutable applicability ... [it] can assume the arbitrators knew the rule . .
Vacatur becomes a reality if the reviewing court is willing to "bootstrap" its way
from the inference of constructive knowledge of the law (based on the clarity of the
legal doctrine at issue) by the arbitrator to a finding by the court that an individual
possessed of a knowledge of that law could not possibly have decided the case as the
arbitrator did, unless she chose to disregard the law.42
The distinguishing characteristic of this mode of analysis is the predisposition
of the court to assume the "mens rea" element of the "manifest disregard" inquiry
is satisfied without any objective verification of that finding. This judicial
willingness to make a cognitive leap, from the perceived clarity of the controlling
law and the strong exception a court takes to the arbitral result, to the conclusion that
the arbitrator must have known the law and chose to ignore it, is remarkable.
This second model for the "manifest disregard" of the law analysis is the most
troublesome of the three current variants. It raises the prospect of vacatur when a
party believes that (i) the controlling law is beyond dispute, and (ii) the award is
clearly inconsistent with that law. The problem is that neither of these findings, even
if justified, provides any reliable, objective indicia of the arbitrator's actual state of
mind, his knowledge of the law. The "Big Error" model effectively dispenses with
the second, "mens rea" element of the "manifest disregard" inquiry.
Reduced to its essence, this second approach to the "manifest disregard" of the
law analysis consists of nothing more than a determination of whether the arbitrator
41. Advest, 914 F.2d at 10, quoted in Tanner, 72 F.3d at 240.
42. See id. (holding that a court can find "manifest disregard" of the law where "the governing law
[has] such widespread familiarity, pristine clarity, and irrefutable applicability that a court could assume
the arbitrators knew the rule and, notwithstanding, swept it under the rug"); Willemijn
Houdstermaatschappij, BV v. Standard Microsystems Corp., 103 F.3d 9, 12-13 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating
that in the absence of a reasoned award, "a reviewing court can only infer from the facts of the case
whether 'the arbitrator[s] appreciate[d] the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
decide[d] to ignore it or pay no attention to it' (quoting Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v.
Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986) (emphasis added)); see also Jaros, 70 F.3d at 421 (stating that
vacatur for "manifest disregard of the law" is appropriate where "(1) the applicable legal principle is
clearly defined and not subject to reasonable debate; and (2) the arbitrators refused to heed that legal
principle").
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made an error of law that a reviewing court is unwilling to tolerate. The reality for
the courts under this view in the contemporary "no reasoned awards" scenario is well
stated by the recent opinion by the Second Circuit in Willemijn
Houdstermaatschappi, BV, v. Standard Microsystems Corp.43 The Second Circuit
observed that in applying the "manifest disregard" of the law ground a court can
"confirm the arbitrator's decision 'if a ground for the arbitrator's decision can be
inferred from the rest of the case. ""4 By this test, the challenged award must be
confirmed "if there is 'even a barely colorable justification for the outcome reached
.... ,, Alternatively, "a court may infer that the arbitrators manifestly disregarded
the law if it finds that the error [of law] made by the made by the arbitrators is
obvious [as measured by whatever degree of error standard the particular court has
embraced]. 46
Under the Standard Microsystems formulation of the "manifest disregard" of
the law test, vacatur is warranted on two alternative bases. First, an award can be
overturned if the court is unable to infer an appropriate ground for the arbitrator's
award from the record before it. Alternatively, vacatur can transpire if the court
perceives in the award what amounts to a gross error of law that offends its sense of
justice.
The Standard Microsystems opinion is remarkable for its candor. At once it
both strips away the faqade of a genuine effort at inferring arbitral knowledge and
discloses the true danger posed by the contemporary, error-focused "manifest
disregard" standard. To a party that believes it has been seriously wronged in an
important case, the temptation to employ this constructive knowledge device in
support of a petition for vacatur is undoubtedly great. It presents the prospect of
achieving vacatur without being required to prove that the arbitrator actually was
aware of the correct interpretation of the relevant law.
It is true that, to date, no court of appeals has vacated a commercial arbitration
award under this version of the "manifest disregard" of the law analysis. The
reported case law indicates that fact has not deterred substantial numbers of parties
from seeking vacatur under the "manifest disregard" standard based solely on the
assertion that the arbitrator made a "big" error of law. Given the near certainty that
such petitions will be rejected, it seems clear this variant of the "manifest disregard"
serves little purpose beyond delaying the time to final resolution in arbitration and
increasing the cost and complexity of the process. The destabilizing effect it has on
commercial arbitration is unmistakable.
E. The Presumption-Based Approach to the "Manifest Disregard"
of the Law Analysis
The third approach to the "manifest disregard" of the law construct has
emerged only very recently. It is embodied in the opinion of the Eleventh Circuit
43. 103 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1997).
44. Id. at 13 (quoting Sobel v. Hertz, Warner & Co., 469 F.2d 1211, 1216 (2d Cir. 1972)).
45. Id. (quoting Andros Compania Maritima v. Marc Rich & Co., 579 F.2d 691, 704 (2d Cir. 1978)).
46. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986)).
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in Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros47 and the opinion of the Second Circuit in
Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc.4  To date, Montes and Halligan are the only cases in
which U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have vacated commercial arbitration awards
for "manifest disregard" of the law. The key to that result in both cases was the
willingness of the courts (i) to presume, through various devices, arbitral knowledge
of the correct interpretation of the law at issue, based upon the courts independent
evaluation of the record made in arbitration, and (ii) based on the presumption, to
infer a conscious or intentional disregard of the law.
In Montes the Eleventh Circuit's presumption was apparently based solely on
the assertion by the prevailing party's counsel at the hearing that the controlling law
was "not right," and his repeated exhortations to the arbitration panel that they
should do what was right, even if it produced an outcome inconsistent with the
pertinent law.49 The court noted that the summary of the parties' arguments set out
in the award demonstrated that the arbitrators recognized they had been "flagrantly
and blatantly urged" to ignore the law." Without further explanation it then
concluded that the application of the "manifest disregard" of the law construct was
justified because "the arbitrators recognized that they were told to disregard the law
(which the record reflects they knew) in a case where the evidence to support the
award was marginal."'"
By the Eleventh Circuit's test, the arbitrator's presumed knowledge of the
correct law, coupled with the absence of anything in the record "to suggest that the
law was not disregarded" (there being no reasoned award) warranted vacatur for
"manifest disregard" of the law. What is significant about this analytical tack is the
fact that it produced a finding of "disregard" with any concrete indicia that the
arbitrators consciously or intentionally chose to dismiss or ignore the law that they
were presumed to have known. Instead, the court inferred knowing disregard of the
law by the arbitrators because it found no evidence that they did not disregard it.
This extraordinary act of "bootstrapping" by the Eleventh Circuit achieved vacatur
under the "manifest disregard" of the law standard without the benefit of any
objective evidence that the arbitrators actually knew the law, and possessed of the
that knowledge consciously or intentionally chose to ignore it.
Halligan involved a petition for vacatur under Section 10(a) of the FAA of an
arbitration award centering on a claim of illegal age discrimination brought under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Following the normal "drill"
in "manifest disregard of the law" cases, the Second Circuit first emphasized that the
"reach of the doctrine of ["manifest disregard"] is severely limited."52 It then stated
further that in order to vacate for "manifest disregard of the law" a court must "find
both that (1) the arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle yet refused to apply
47. 128 F.3d 1456 (11 th Cir. 1997).
48. 148 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 1998).
49. Id. at 1459.
50. Id. at 1461.
51. Id. at 1462. Immediately following this observation the court engaged in more than three pages
of analysis of the facts in the arbitral record, following which it concluded that the key question of fact
before the arbitrators could not have been resolved in a manner that would have led to the challenged
award. Id. at 1462-64.
52. Halligan v. Piper Jaffray, Inc., 148 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1998).
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it or ignored it altogether, and (2) the law ignored by the arbitrators was well
defined, explicit, and clearly applicable to the case.""3
After discussing the "growing concern" over the problem of employees being
held to their a priori agreements to arbitrate statutory-based employment
discrimination claims, the court proceeded to review the proof of illegal age
discrimination adduced by the claimant employee, characterizing the proof as
"overwhelming."' 4 It found further that the arbitrators had been advised by the
counsel for both parties of the correct legal principles on which the outcome of the
arbitration should have turned.55
Because of the strong proof of illegal discrimination it found in the record,
combined with the fact that the arbitrators had been advised of the correct law, the
Second Circuit concluded, "we are inclined to hold that [the arbitrators] ignored the
law or the evidence or both."56 The court made clear that the arbitrators' failure to
explain the basis for their award denying the claim of illegal discrimination was a
factor in its holding.57 The decision rule reflected in Halligan echoes that set out in
Montes. By its terms vacatur of an award is warranted for "manifest disregard" of
the law if a court, after evaluating the facts and the law, concludes the award was
wrong and finds nothing in the award itself to demonstrate that the arbitrators did not
knowingly ignore the law.
The framework for analysis under this third model works backwards from an
arbitral outcome the reviewing court believes to be flawed as a matter of law,
confirmed by an exhaustive evaluation of the factual record made in arbitration.
This judicial rethinking of the factual questions and the questions of application of
law to facts integral to the resolution of the matter in arbitration is coupled with a
search for evidence in the record upon which the court can base a presumption of
arbitral knowledge of the correct law. Once that evidence is identified the court is
free to "bootstrap" its way to the inference that the arbitrator must have ignored the
relevant law in fashioning an award the court believes is contrary to the law.
The Montes-Halligan model for the "manifest disregard" of the law inquiry
provides a convenient means for circumventing the problem caused by trhe frequent
absence in commercial arbitration of reasoned awards revealing the arbitrator's mode
of analysis. It does so by using a presumption of arbitral knowledge of the correct
interpretation of the law to justify an inference of conscious or intentional disregard
of the law-both findings achieved without benefit of any direct evidence of the
arbitrator's actual state of mind. Thus, this model solves the dilemma that leads to
the "futility acknowledge" mode of analysis under the "manifest disregard" of the
law standard. It also avoids blatant dismissal of the "mens rea" element that flaws
the "big error" variant of the "manifest disregard" inquiry.
The problem inherent in this approach is that in applying it a court grants itself
a de facto license, in the course of deciding whether to vacate a challenged award for
"manifest disregard" of the law, to reexamine in depth the outcome determinative
53. Id.
54. Id. at 202-03.
55. Id. at 203-04.
56. Id. at 204.
57. Id.
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questions of fact, law and application of law to fact that the parties had contracted
to resolve in arbitration. If the outcome reached in arbitration does not jibe with the
result indicated by a court's independent evaluation of the facts and the law, vacatur
is triggered.
It is difficult to distinguish this mode of the "manifest disregard" of the law
inquiry from a straightforward review of the merits of arbitration awards. As long
as counsel for the party petitioning for vacatur is careful to ensure the arbitral record
contains an articulation and explanation of relevant law, it can achieve vacatur by
convincing a reviewing court that given the facts in the record (as ascertained by the
court-not the arbitrator), the arbitral decision could have been achieved only if the
arbitrators ignored or misapplied the law.
Instead of looking to the award for evidence of arbitrator misconduct in
knowingly or intentionally ignoring the correct law, the court looks to the award for
an absence of evidence indicating proper conduct by the arbitrator. Finding none (as
invariably will be the case where there is no reasoned award), the court may vacate
the offending award by inferring that the arbitrators must have ignored the law.
Thus vacatur can occur for "manifest disregard" of the law even though the arbitral
outcome might just as likely have resulted from the arbitrators having not understood
the legal arguments made to them or from inaccurate arbitral findings of fact. Unless
the arbitrators have in some manner articulated their basis for decision, the true
source of the erroneous award cannot be reliably determined. Undeterred by this
void in the evidence, a court applying the Montes-Halligan standard will vacate for
"manifest disregard" of the law even though it has no concrete, objective basis for
divining what was in the arbitrators' minds (regarding knowledge of the law and
intent to nullify it), or ascertaining how the arbitrators resolved the key questions of
fact and application of law to facts before them.
Montes and Halligan are remarkable opinions that epitomize the danger posed
by the current modes of analysis under the "manifest disregard of the law" standard.
It is clear the Second Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit both used the "manifest
disregard" device as a vehicle, a clever disguise that enabled them to substitute their
judgment for that of the arbitrators chosen by the parties to decide the matters in
dispute in those cases. This is a most significant development in light of the oft-
repeated mantra that in deciding petitions for vacatur courts are not to intrude into
the merits of arbitration awards by second guessing arbitrators' decisions of
questions of law, contract or fact. The opinions are also remarkable because they
virtually mandate reasoned awards in cases involving issues of law, in order to
preclude the presumption of "manifest disregard" when a court finds a grave error
of law in the arbitral result.
This new, third mode of analysis under the "manifest disregard" of the law
standard seems certain to propel many disgruntled parties and their counsel to file
numerous petitions for vacatur. For a party bitterly disappointed with the arbitral
outcome in an important case, the hope of achieving vacatur by persuading a court
that full evaluation of the arbitration record will justify a presumption of arbitral
knowledge of the correct law will no doubt often prove irresistible. Widespread
judicial willingness to make the substantial cognitive leap from findings as to the
nature of the parties' argument and the material facts, to the conclusion that the
arbitrator must have known the law and then proceeded to ignore would greatly
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diminish the finality and the integrity of the commercial arbitration process. This is
a reality the courts and other public policy makers must confront forthrightly.
F. Conclusion
Beyond the factors identified above, there is one overriding reason for rejecting
the current paradigm for the "manifest disregard" of the law analysis. Despite the
various attempts to distinguish the nature of the judicial inquiry, all three of these
formulations begin, with and center upon the perceived degree of legal error
reflected in the award.58 Because many of the circuit courts of appeals opinions
applying the "manifest disregard" of the law ground do not clearly describe the
process of inference-drawing/presumption that is required in the absence of reasoned
awards, they inadvertently misdirect the arguments of parties seeking vacatur. As
a result the "manifest disregard" of the law inquiry often permutes from a test
centering on the arbitrator's state of mind (knowledge of the correct law and his
motivation regarding that law in applying it) and his conduct (failure or refusal to
apply that law while possessed of that knowledge), into an analysis concerned only
with the purported correctness of the arbitration award on the law, and in some cases
the facts.
This core characteristic of the three variants of the contemporary "manifest
disregard" of the law analysis encourages losing parties in arbitration who believe
they have been wronged to seek vacatur, based largely or solely upon the allegation
that the award resulted from an egregious error of law. Those parties petition for
vacatur without fully contemplating the great difficulty they will encounter in
attempting to prove the second, "mens rea" element of the "manifest disregard" of
the law ground-by demonstrating that the arbitrator knew the correct law, and
possessed of that knowledge consciously or intentionally chose to ignore the law.
That many members of the commercial arbitration bar have not come to grips with
the bifurcated, two-element nature of the "manifest disregard" inquiry is confirmed
by the numerous reported cases wherein petitions for vacatur are brought absent any
allegation that the arbitrator had knowledge (constructive or actual) of the
controlling law.
The continued filing of misguided and invariably futile petitions for vacatur
invoking this construct prompts the courts to continue their tortured efforts to
fashion "degree of error" and inference/presumption-based tests for applying the
"manifest disregard" of the law ground in the absence of reasoned awards. As the
commentary above demonstrates, without reasoned awards revealing the arbitrator's
mode of decision, there is no reliable, objective way for a court to ascertain that both
of the components of the "mens rea" element of the "manifest disregard" of the law
inquiry (arbitrator knowledge of the correct law and a conscious or intentional
decision to ignore or misapply the law) have been satisfied. This phenomenon
58. The analysis under the second and third variants of the "manifest disregard" of the law standard
is confused for another reason. The courts applying those two inference-based models generally fail to
satisfactorily reconcile their reliance on a significant error of law with the oft-repeated admonition of
the Supreme Court in Wilko that "interpretations of the law ... are not subject, in the federal courts, to
judicial review for error in interpretation." Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436.
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destabilizes the process of commercial arbitration, increasing costs and time to
resolution in many cases by providing disappointed advocates and parties with an
illusory promise of securing justice from a court of law when they believe they have
been denied it in arbitration.
Because the three contemporary variants of the "manifest disregard" of the law
criterion center upon the correctness of either the arbitrator's interpretation of the
law or the manner in which he applies that law to the facts, they are all inconsistent
with the oft-repeated admonition of the Supreme Court in Wilko that "interpretations
of law... are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation."5 9 The "error-based" models for the "manifest disregard" of the law
analysis also conflict with Section 10(a) of the FAA, which likewise does not
contemplate vacatur for errors of law. If the line between confirming and vacating
a commercial arbitration award challenged on the arbitrator's resolution of a
question of law is determined primarily by the clarity of the relevant law and/or the
degree of the arbitrator's purported error in interpreting and applying that law,
judicial intrusion into the merits of the arbitrator's decision will always remain a
possibility. 6° Section 10(a) does not permit this type of judicial scrutiny of
challenged commercial arbitration awards.6'
The key to vacatur under the "manifest disregard" of the law construct is not
an error of law. It is the arbitral act of disregarding the law that warrants vacatur.
An arbitrator cannot be proven to have consciously or intentionally ignored or
misapplied the correct law until the petitioner for vacatur proves that she knew that
law. None of the three current modes of the "manifest disregard" analysis begin
with, turn upon, or lead to reliable, objective findings as to arbitral state of mind (his
knowledge of the current law and motivation in applying that law) that is the
predicate to an award made in disregard of the law. At the same time, none of the
three models facilitates vacatur for "manifest disregard" of the law without obliging
a reviewing court to delve into the merits of the challenged award-substituting its
59. Id.
60. See San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd., 293 F.2d 796, 801
n.4 (9th Cir. 1961) (Criticizing the "degree of error" test for application of the "manifest disregard of the
law" standard, the Ninth Circuit observed "[s]uch a 'degree of error' test would, we think be most
difficult to apply. Results would likely vary from judge to judge. We believe this is not what the
[Supreme] court had in mind when it spoke of 'manifest disregard."'); see also I/S Stavborg v. National
Metal Converters, Inc., 500 F.2d 424, 430 n.13 (2d Cir. 1974) ("How courts are to distinguish in the
Supreme Court's phrase between 'erroneous interpretation' of a statute, or for that matter, a clause in a
contract, and 'manifest disregard' of it, we do not know: one man's 'interpretation' may be another's
'disregard.' Is an 'irrational' misinterpretation a 'manifest disregard?').
A prime example of the threat of judicial intrusion into the merits of commercial arbitration
awards presented by an inordinate focus on the degree of the arbitrator's purported error of law is found
in the Sixth Circuit's application of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard in Glennon v. Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. 83 F.3d 132 (6th Cir. 1996). The court, in denying the petitioner's claim described
at some length the evidence in the arbitral record concerning the disputed question of law and
independently analyzed that evidence in concluding that the challenged award of punitive damages by
the arbitration panel was not in manifest disregard of the law. Id.
61. But see Cole v. Burns Int'l. Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1486-87, (D.C. Cir. 1997) (Discussing
the Supreme Court's endorsement of the arbitration of statutory claims, the Court stated: "[the]
assumptions regarding the arbitration of statutory claims are valid only if the "manifest disregard of the
law" standard is sufficiently rigorous to ensure that arbitrators have properly interpreted and applied
statutory law.").
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judgment for the arbitrator's with regard to the outcome determinative questions of
fact and application of law to fact. Therefore, they must all be rejected because they
conflict with Section 1 0(a) of the FAA and are inconsistent with the true nature of
the inquiry called for by the Wilko dictum and the "manifest disregard" of the law
ground for vacatur which it created.
The Section that follows describes a new framework for analysis of the
"manifest disregard" of the law ground that returns the focus where it belongs-to
the arbitrator's knowledge of the law and his conduct in light of that knowledge.
V. A BETTER MODEL FOR THE "MANIFEST DISREGARD" OF
THE LAW ANALYSIS
The current broad acceptance by the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals of the
"manifest disregard" of the law ground indicates it will remain a key dimension of
the commercial arbitration milieu until or unless it is squarely rejected by the
Supreme Court, an event whose timing and occurrence cannot be reliably predicted.
For reasons discussed below is quite possible that the Supreme Court will ultimately
reject the "manifest disregard" of the law standard. Nevertheless, an effort to frame
the "manifest disregard" analysis in a manner that both fully contemplates the "actus
reus" and the "mens rea" elements and harmonizes the "manifest disregard" of the
law ground with Section 10(a) of the FAA is warranted here. The model described
below achieves both of these objectives.
A. The Hallmarks of a Proper Model for Analysis
The full dictum in which the "manifest disregard" of the law construct was first
verbalized in Wilko demonstrates that the Supreme Court viewed it as something
quite different, separate and distinct, from an error of law. Carefully read in its full
context, the Wilko dictum leaves no doubt that "interpretations of the law by [the]
arbitrators," even those that are seriously flawed and readily apparent, are not subject
to vacatur.62 Consequently, as argued strenuously above, correct application of the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard cannot turn upon the degree of the
arbitrator's purported error of law.63
62. The full dictum reads:
[w]hile it may be true... that a failure of the arbitrators to decide in accordance with the
provisions of [relevant law] would "constitute grounds for vacating the award pursuant to
Section 10[a] of the Federal Arbitration Act, (citation omitted) that failure would need to
be made clearly to appear. In unrestricted submissions [to arbitration] . . . the
interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard [of the law]
are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.
Wilko, 346 U.S. at 436 (emphasis added).
63. See San Martine, 293 F.2d at 801 n.4 ("Conceivably the words ["manifest disregard"] may have
been used to indicate that whether an award may be set aside would be a question of degree. Thus if the
award was based upon a mistaken view of the law, but in their assumption of what the law was, the
arbitrators had not gone too far afield, then, the award would stand; but if the error is an egregious one,
such as no sensible layman would be guilty of, then the award could be set aside. Such a 'degree of
error'test would, we think, be most difjicult to apply." (emphasis added)); see also Hayford, supra note
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Vacatur for "manifest disregard of the law" should occur when a reviewing
court agrees with the arbitrator's interpretation of the law (when it can reliably
divine that arbitral state of mind), but subsequently determines that the neutral
engaged in intentional or at least knowing misconduct by ignoring or failing to apply
that correct reading of the law in resolving the dispute before her.' This mode of
analysis turns not on the degree of an arbitrator's purported error of law but on the
"degree of [her] disregard" of the law.65 It speaks not to the correctness of the
arbitrator's decision on the law, but to the manner in which the arbitrator reached
that decision.
If a reviewing court can objectively ascertain the arbitrator's interpretation of
the relevant law and disagrees with it (i.e., finds in the award reliable evidence that
the arbitrator misunderstood the law), the "manifest disregard" inquiry stops and the
award must be confirmed. This is so because an arbitrator cannot "disregard" the
law unless she knows it, correctly. This misconduct-centered approach to
implementing the "manifest disregard of the law" standard erects an impenetrable
barrier to disguised judicial oversight of the arbitrator's resolution of the questions
of law and application of law to fact submitted to arbitration for decision.
Evaluation of the extent to which the arbitration award (the product of the
arbitrator's application of the relevant law to the material facts) conflicts with
relevant law should occur at the back end of the "manifest disregard" analysis, not
at the front end. A judicial determination that the award conflicts with the law (at
the requisite level of clarity) triggers vacatur only if the court has first reliably and
objectively confirmed that the arbitrator understood the law correctly.
Under this framework for analysis the "actus reus" element is not proven by
convincing the reviewing court that the arbitrator has made an a grave error of law.
Rather, it is the arbitrator's conscious or intentional act of disregarding the law he
has been objectively proven to know that completes the inquiry. This act of
disregarding the law with the intent to do so, or the knowledge that one is doing so
is the precise arbitral misconduct proscribed by the "manifest disregard" of the law
ground for vacatur. Absent a reliable judicial finding of that state of arbitral mind
(with regard to the arbitrator's knowledge of the law and her intention to misapply
or ignore it or at least the awareness that she was doing so), vacatur for "manifest
disregard" of the law is not warranted.
4, at 810-19 (discussing the "manifest disregard of the law" nonstatutory ground); cf. Kenneth R. Davis,
When Ignorance of the Law is No Excuse: Judicial Review of Arbitration Awards, 45 BUFF. L. REV. 49,
98 (1997) ("The purpose of [the "manifest disregard of the law" standard] is to provide some measure
of review of substantive error in arbitration awards. As a means of correcting error, the standard might
reasonably consider the magnitude, quality and consequence of the error under review, rather than the
arbitrator's state of mind, a matter of irrelevance."). The analysis in the article above makes clear the
present Author's strongly-held belief that the view of the "manifest disregard of the law" standard
articulated by Professor Davis is wrong.
64. For a full discussion of this view of the proper interpretation and application of the "manifest
disregard of the law" nonstatutory ground for vacatur, see Hayford, supra note 4, at 810-19.
65. See Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[T]here must be 'something
beyond and different from a mere error in the law or failure on the part of the arbitrators to understand
or apply the law,' (citation omitted) in order to sustain a finding of manifest disregard of the law.
Illustrative of the degree of 'disregard' necessary to support vacatur under this standard is our holding
that manifest disregard will be found where an 'arbitrator' 'understood and correctly stated the law but
proceeded to ignore it."' (quoting Siegel v. Titan Indus. Corp., 779 F.2d 891, 892, 893 (2d Cir. 1986))).
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Undoubtedly this mode of analysis will almost never result in vacatur for
"manifest disregard" of the law in the absence of reasoned awards revealing the
manner in which the arbitrator applied the relevant law to the facts of the matter in
dispute. That is the price the parties pay for foregoing reasoned awards. Even if
there is a reasoned award, this paradigm will produce appropriate judicial decisions
because it focuses the inquiry on the arbitrator's state of mind and conduct, without
requiring or permitting a reviewing court to engage in its own independent
evaluation of the facts and the proper application of the law to those facts in order
to support subjective inferences in that regard. As such, it returns the judicial inquiry
under the "manifest disregard" rubric to an appropriate, very narrow scope.
None of the current models for the "manifest disregard" of the law analysis
orders the judicial inquiry in the manner described above and precludes reviewing
courts from intruding into the merits of the arbitrator's award (its accuracy on the
facts and correctness on the relevant law). Therefore, they should be rejected in
favor of the model proposed here. The section that follows describes the manner in
which the "manifest disregard" of the law standard can be reconciled with the very
restricted, misconduct-focused grounds for vacatur set out in Section 10(a) of the
FAA.
B. Harmonizing the "Manifest Disregard" of the Law Ground With
Section I 0(a) of the FAA
If the "manifest disregard" of the law ground is to survive in the long run it must
be harmonized with the "no review on the merits" rule of Section 10(a) of the FAA.
The key to achieving that result lies in the Wilko dictum from which the "manifest
disregard" construct arose. The Court's intonation of the term "manifest disregard"
was made within the context of elaborating upon an assertion in the sentence
preceding it that "[w]hile it may be true, . . . that a failure of the arbitrators to
decide in accordance with the provisions of [the relevant law] would 'constitute
grounds for vacating the award pursuant to section 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act'
(citation omitted) that failure would have to be made clearly to appear." Careful
parsing of this "forgotten" first sentence of the Wilko dictum reveals several things.
The initial clause of that sentence starts with the qualifying phrase "while it may
be true" and goes on to refer to the possibility that a failure by the arbitrators to
comport their award with applicable law could warrant vacatur "pursuant to section
10[a] of the FAA." On their face, the words chosen by the Court indicate that it was
speaking, not to a non-statutory ground for vacatur, but rather to the possibility of
vacatur as contemplated by section 10[a] of the FAA.' The second and third clauses
of the first sentence state that if vacatur for an arbitral failure or refusal to decide a
dispute in accordance with the provisions of relevant law were warranted under
66. The Court has never expressly categorized "manifest disregard" of the law as a non-statutory
ground. See I/S Stavborg, 500 F.2d at 430 ("In Wilko v. Swan, (citation omitted), the Court was
presented with the narrow question of whether certain provisions of the Securities Act of 1933
invalidated a stipulation in which a purchaser of securities agreed to settle any differences arising out
of the purchase by recourse to arbitration. The Court, in answering this question in the affirmative,
seemed to say, that a decision by an arbitrator disregarding the applicable securities laws would have
been reversible under 9 US. C. § 10 .... (emphasis added)).
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Section 10[a], "that failure would have to be made clear to appear."
It is within this context that the term "manifest disregard" of the law standard
was coined. When the oft-quoted portion of the Wilko dictum is returned to, and
read within, the context of the full paragraph from which it was drawn, its legitimacy
as the basis for a separate, non-statutory ground for vacatur is eviscerated. The
standard categorization of "manifest disregard" of the law as a non-statutory ground
centering on the merits of commercial arbitration awards and the interpretations and
application of relevant law by commercial arbitrators in the course of deciding the
merits, does not make sense in light of the manner in which that standard was
articulated by the Supreme Court in Wilko.
The more plausible reading of the Wilko dictum is one whereby its oblique
reference to "manifest disregard" of the law is viewed as identifying a type of
arbitral misconduct or misbehavior of the nature addressed in section 1 0(a)(3) of the
FAA.67 If "manifest disregard" is understood only to occur, as the author has
suggested, when an arbitrator has correctly interpreted the law and then consciously
or intentionally ignored it, then "manifest disregard" describes a kind of untoward
arbitral behavior which fits neatly within the proscription on arbitrator "misconduct"
and "misbehavior" contained in Section 10(a)(3) of the FAA. If the court concludes
that the arbitrator did ignore the law that she correctly understood, then vacatur of
the disputed arbitration award would be warranted for arbitrator misconduct in a
manner fully embraced by Section 10(a) (3) of the FAA. A party seeking vacatur
of a commercial arbitration under section 10(a)(3) on this ground must prove a nexus
between the arbitrator's "manifest disregard" of the law and the arbitral result.68 In
other words, the arbitrator's refusal or failure to apply the correct law must be
directly linked to the challenged arbitral result. Absent such objective proof, a
reviewing court, no matter how incorrect or inaccurate the court may perceive the
award to be cannot usurp the award.
Under this paradigm, vacatur of the award transpires, not because the arbitrator
made an error of law (i.e., misinterpreted the law), but rather because she
intentionally or consciously ignored or misapplied the law. The reason for vacatur
is not an erroneous decision, rather it is the manner in which that decision was made.
This misconduct/misbehavior-centered approach to implementation of the "manifest
disregard" of the law standard erects a substantial barrier to judicial evaluation of the
arbitrator's resolution of the merits of the dispute before her.69 It also precludes a
reviewing court from vacating a commercial arbitration award because it disagrees
with the arbitrator's interpretation of the law or findings of fact.
67. See Remmey v. Painewebber, Inc., 32 F.3d 143, 146 (4th Cir. 1994) (characterizing the four
section 10(a) grounds as warranting vacatur for "sufficiently improper conduct in the course of the
[arbitration] proceedings"); cf San Martine Compania de Navegacion, S.A. v. Saguenay Terminals Ltd.,
293 F.2d 796, 801 (9th Cir. 1961) (observing that "manifest infidelity to what the arbitrators knew to
be the law ... might well be regarded as the use of 'undue means' within the meaning of [section
10(a)(1) of the FAA)], or amount to 'partiality' within the meaning of [section 10(a)(2) of the FAA]").
68. Hayford, supra note 4, at 748.
69. Thus, judicial examination of the arbitrator's alleged error of law, in terms of the arbitral
application of law to the facts of the dispute in the course of reaching the arbitral result, does not occur
unless there is clear evidence that the arbitrator correctly understood the law.
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C. Conclusion
The dynamic just described is a far cry from a "manifest disregard" of the law
analysis that begins with ascertaining the degree of the arbitrator's purported error
of law and works backwards, by inference, to the conclusion that the arbitrator must
have known the law and, possessed of that knowledge, consciously or intentionally
disregarded it. It precludes a party from alleging vacatur is warranted based solely
on the claim of a gross error of law by the arbitrator. Instead, the petitioner for
vacatur must demonstrate at the outset that the "mens rea" element of the "manifest
disregard" of the law standard is satisfied.
This approach to the "manifest disregard" standard also prevents a reviewing
court from "bootstrapping" its way from an unverified inference or presumption of
arbitral knowledge of the correct law to the ultimate conclusion that vacatur for
"manifest disregard" of the law is justified. It shifts the focus away from the legal
correctness of the arbitrator's decision and obviates the need for judicial "line
drawing" between small and big errors of law. It fully respects the contrast seen by
the Wilko court between an arbitrator's "interpretations of the law" and "manifest
disregard" of the law. Vacatur of a challenged award for "manifest disregard" of the
law will occur only if the court makes an objective determination that the arbitrator
actually knew the law and then consciously or intentionally disregarded it.
The model advocated here sets down a clear, unequivocal standard for vacatur
under the "manifest disregard" of the law ground. It should lead to consistent results
and drastically reduce the number of futile petitions for vacatur. Because the
proposed framework for analysis properly orders and effects the two elements of the
requisite inquiry ("mens rea" first and "actus reus" second), it is also fully consistent
with the Wilko dictum.
This approach also fully legitimates the "manifest disregard" of the law ground
for vacatur by moving it out of the realm of the non-statutory grounds and
comporting it with section 10(a) of the FAA. As a result it reconciles much of the
apparent incongruity between the "manifest disregard" of the law construct and the
public policy underlying section 10(a) of the FAA, which clearly does not
contemplate judicial review of the merits of commercial arbitration awards. For all
these reasons, this framework for decision of petitions for vacatur because of
"manifest disregard" of the law should be adopted by the courts.
VI. "MANIFEST DISREGARD" OF THE LAW-THE KEY TO
STABILIZING THE LAW OF VACATUR
It is far from clear that, given its present enthusiasm for commercial arbitration
and concomitant broad endorsement of the pro-arbitration public policy of the FAA,
the present Supreme Court would embrace the "manifest disregard" of the law
ground for vacatur.7 ° It was created "ex nihilo " in what may well have been only a
70. See Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28 F.3d 704,706 (7th Cir. 1994).
Created ex nihilo to be a non-statutory ground for setting aside arbitral awards, the Wilko
formula reflects precisely [the] mistrust of arbitration for which the [Supreme] Court in its
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passing, insignificant reference, in dictum.7' The oblique nature of the Supreme
Court's reference to the "manifest disregard" of the law ground in Wilko, and the
subsequent lack of guidance from the Court as to the proper meaning and effect of
this criterion for vacatur, indicate how slender a reed it rests upon. The uncertainty
pertaining to, and the long run viability of the "manifest disregard" of the law ground
for vacatur most likely will be addressed in one of two ways-either by the Supreme
Court rejecting it as inconsistent with Section 10(a) of the FAA, or by the Court
bringing it within the embrace of Section 10(a)(3) of the Act consistent with the view
articulated in the preceding commentary.
Of at least equal importance is the fact the fact that the Wilko dictum was framed
at a time when the Supreme Court harbored strong suspicions of the integrity, rigor
and competence of both the commercial arbitration process and commercial
arbitrators. In rediscovering the FAA in the years since the early 1980s, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly rejected the "suspicion of arbitration" (and arbitrators) that
underpinned Wilko.72  Wilko itself was reversed in Rodriguez de Quyas v.
Shearson/American Express, Inc.,"3 providing sound basis for arguing that all
dimensions of Wilko, including the "manifest disregard" of the law dictum, have
been mooted.74
In resolving critical issues pertaining to the enforceability of contractual
agreements to arbitrate, substantive arbitrability and the preemptive effect of the
FAA, the Supreme Court has taken a very literal and expansive view of the Act's
reach and scope.75 Given that consistent position, it is difficult to imagine the Court
would be willing to set aside the clear and unambiguous language of Section 10(a)
two Shearson/American Express opinions criticized Wilko. We can understand neither the
need for the formula nor the role that it plays in judicial review of arbitration [awards] (we
suspect none - that it is just words). If it is meant to smuggle review for clear error in by
the back door, it is inconsistent with the entire modem law of arbitration.
Id.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate Lane/Johnson, Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991); Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth,
Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
73. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
74. See Forsythe Int'l, S.A. v. Gibbs Oil Co. of Texas, 915 F.2d 1017, 1022 n.5 (5th Cir. 1990)
("Wilko v. Swan was overruled on other grounds in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,
Inc. (citation omitted). In Rodriguez, the Supreme Court noted Wilko's expressed 'suspicion of
arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law,' and based its
reversal on the extent to which that decision 'had fallen far out of step with our current strong
endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes."' (quoting Rodriguez de
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481 (1989))).
75. See, e.g., Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625-26 ("The preeminent concern of Congress in passing the
[FAA] was to enforce private agreements into which the parties had entered," a concern which "requires
that we rigorously enforce agreements to arbitrate"); Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984)
("In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and
withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the
contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration... Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of
arbitration agreements."); Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983)
(The court characterized section 2 of the FAA as "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy
favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive or procedural policies to the
contrary" that constitutes a "body of federal substantive law of arbitrability applicable to any arbitration
agreement within the [FAA].").
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and, relying on obiter dictum from an opinion it has reversed and whose underlying
principles it has squarely rejected, hold that Congress did not intend for the FAA to
set the exclusive standards for vacatur of commercial arbitration awards.
Thus there are sound legal reasons to speculate that the Supreme Court may
eventually reject the "manifest disregard" of the law standard as conflicting with
Section 10(a) of the FAA and the Act's strong pro-arbitration policy. Other,
practical considerations also indicate that is the appropriate outcome. By providing
the touchstone for the other nonstatutory grounds for vacatur, all of which sanction
judicial review of the merits of awards, the "manifest disregard" of the law standard
has prevented the emergence of on the record decision making (i.e., reasoned
awards) in commercial arbitration. As explained earlier, in the absence of reasoned
awards it is very unlikely that commercial arbitration will ever achieve its full
potential as an alternative dispute resolution device.
Even if it passes muster before the Supreme Court, the preceding analysis
demonstrates that each of the three current views of this nonstatutory ground for
vacatur should be rejected. If it were eventually to be fully confirmed as good law,
the "manifest disregard" of the law ground for vacatur should be reconfigured in the
manner advocated above and recognized as emanating from section I 0(a)(3) of the
FAA. The model advocated here would require only a minor "sharpening" of the
case law in the circuits that currently recognize this standard. It would serve to
impose discipline on what is now a highly disordered sub-component of the law of
vacatur and thereby hasten the maturation and institutionalization of the commercial
arbitration process. Those are most desirable prospects for those who believe in the
potential of commercial arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution device.
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